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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
JAYORDAN,
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)

Plaintiff,

v.
BRIAN KEEN and HEALTH
COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES, LLC,
Defendants.

Civil Action File No.
2014CV240975
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ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On January 5,2015, the parties appeared before the Court to present oral argument on the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the parties' oral arguments,
briefs, and the record in this case, the Court finds as follows:
In early 2012, Plaintiff Jay Ordan ("Ordan") and Defendant Brian Keen ("Keen"), the
sole owner of Health Cooperative Strategies, LLC, ("HCS"), entered into discussions regarding
the business ofHCS.

HCS helps certain industry associations form and manage health benefit

plans for their members under Georgia's Multiple Employer Welfare Association regulations.
HCS sought investors and Ordan, as a broker of health care products, had industry connections.
In March of2012, Ordan introduced Keen to Steve Needle, an agent of the McCart Group. The
McCart Group eventually invested in HCS. Ordan was paid a finder's fee for this introduction.
Ordan claims that in late June, or early July, 2012, he and Keen verbally agreed that he
would receive a 25% equity stake in HCS in exchange for his continuing marketing, sales, and
general business services. Keen admits that they discussed Ordan becoming an owner ofHCS,
but maintains that the two men never agreed to the terms, and argues that even if there was an
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agreement to the terms, as Ordan suggests, that Ordan did not uphold his purported end of the
agreement. Keen's failure to give Ordan a 25% equity interest is at the heart of his claims.

I

In support of their positions, the parties cite to several documents created in the
following months leading up to March 2013 when Ordan discovered that Keen did not consider
him a 25% owner. First, Keen emailed Ordan discussing compensation on July 2,2012, "per our
conversation." The email discussed a commission structure, but did not mention a 25%
ownership interest.
Next, during July and August 2012, HCS and the McCart Group negotiated a
Memorandum of Understanding that defined the relationship of the companies and finalized the
McCart Group's investment. The final executed Memorandum of Understanding dated August
29,2012,

states, "Jay Ordan will contribute sales oversight, support and creative direction to

HCS and the services of Ken Southerland as the COO of this enterprise as part of his
contribution." Ordan testified that he acted on behalf ofHCS seeking investors, handling
marketing and advertising, and as a partner consulting on all business matters. He contends he
performed this work for HCS relying on Keen's promise of25% equity. Southerland also began
performing duties on behalf of HCS. Ordan testified that Ken Southerland initially had a limited
role in HCS. He was tasked with getting the company records in working order, which, Ordan
claims, included putting together the operating agreement. In exchange for Southerland's
services, Ordan states he promised Southerland a 5% ownership interest in HCS out of his 25%
interest.

I The counts are as follows: Count 1 - Declaratory Judgment; Count 2 - Breach of Contract; Count 3 - Quantum
Meruit (In the alternate to Breach of Contract); Count 4 - Fraud; Count 5 - Breach of Duty to Allow Access to
Company Records in Violation ofO.e.G.A. § 14-11-313; Count 6 -Punitive Damages; Count 8 - Attorney's Fees
and Costs of Litigation. Count 7 for failure to pay minimum wage was voluntarily dismissed.
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Finally, from September 21,2012

to October 31,2012,

multiple drafts of an operating

agreement were created by an attorney procured by Southerland.

The drafts list Keith Ordan,

Ordan's son and intended beneficiary, as having an equity interest in HCS varying from 20% to
26.7%.

They also show Ken Southerland holding a 5% ownership stake in HCS. The operating

agreements were never executed, and the parties dispute the extent of Keen's knowledge of these
drafts.
In performing the work for HCS, Ordan maintained office space with other HCS
executives in the McCart Group offices. The internal phone directory assigned an HCS
designation to Ordan similar to the other HCS principals.

Third parties have also provided

affidavits that Keen and another equity investor referred to Ordan as an equity partner.
Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts.

A court should grant a motion for

summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 when the moving party shows that no

genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter oflaw. Lau's
Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991). "On summary judgment, after the movant
makes a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw, the burden then
shifts to the respondent to come forward with rebuttal evidence." L.D.F. Family Farm, Inc. v.
Charterbank, 326 Ga. App. 361, 362 (2014) (citations omitted).
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs Counsel, at oral argument, advised the Court that Ordan
would not be pursuing his claim for declaratory judgment because he no longer considers himself
a member ofHCS. Accordingly, Count 1 for Declaratory Judgment is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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Additionally, since Ordan is not a current member ofHCS, he does not have standing to
seek relief under O.e.G.A. § 14-11-313. Therefore, summary judgment as to Count 5, Breach of
Duty to Allow Access to Company Records, is hereby GRANTED.
I.

Breach of Contract
Defendants argue that no oral contract was formed because there is no evidence of mutual

assent to the terms, the terms were too indefinite to be enforced, and there was a failure of
consideration. However, each of these arguments fail because the evidence indicates there is a
dispute of fact as to the formation of an oral contract.
"Georgia law recognizes that an oral contract falling outside the purview of the Statute of
Frauds may be binding and enforceable." Turner Broad. Sys. v. McDavid, 303 Ga. App. 593,596
(2010). "To constitute a valid contract, there must be parties able to contract, a consideration
moving to the contract, the assent of the parties to the terms of the contract, and a subject matter
upon which the contract can operate." O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1.
In determining whether there was a mutual assent, courts apply an objective
theory of intent whereby one party's intention is deemed to be that meaning
a reasonable man in the position of the other contracting party would
ascribe to the first party's manifestation or assent, or that meaning which
the other contracting party knew the first party ascribed to his manifestation
of assent. Further, in cases such as this one, the circumstances surrounding
the making of the contract, such as correspondence and discussions, are
relevant in deciding if there was a mutual assent to an agreement. Where
such extrinsic evidence exists and is disputed, the question of whether a
party has assented to the contract is generally a matter for the jury.

Turner Broad. Sys., 303 Ga. App at 597. "Where there is a conflict in evidence as to the
existence of an oral contract or as to its terms, the matter must be submitted to a jury for
resolution." Fay v. Custom One Homes, LLC, 276 Ga. App. 188, 190 (2005).
Here, Ordan has presented sufficient evidence of mutual assent to create a genuine issue
of material fact to be decided by a jury. Although the July 2 email did not mention a 25% equity
4

interest, Ordan has testified that Keen orally promised him a 25% ownership interest in HCS in
exchange for his continuing management role. Although Keen disputes any agreement was
reached, he does admit that they discussed Ordan becoming an owner. Additionally, Ordan has
presented affidavits of third parties who claim that Keen held Ordan out as an equity partner.
Therefore, the evidence of record shows that the circumstances surrounding the making of this
contract could support a determination by the jury that mutual assent existed.
Further, although Defendants' contend the terms are too indefinite for a contract to have
formed, "the law does not favor the destruction of contracts on grounds of uncertainty." Kitchen
v. Insuaramerica Corp., 296 Ga. App. 739, 743 (2009). "[A]n indefinite contract. .. may acquire

more precision and become enforceable because of the subsequent words or actions of the
parties." Id. at 602-03.

Here there is evidence suggesting that Keen and HCS held Ordan out as

an equity owner to third parties, that Ordan was provided HCS office space and an HCS phone
extension, and that Ordan provided his own services to HCS as well as the services of
Southerland as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding between McCart and Keen. On
the other hand, the size of Ordan's equity interest is unclear-25%, 20%, or somewhere between
20% and 26.7%. A jury issue remains as to the terms of any oral contract between the parties.
Finally, Defendants' contend there is a failure of consideration for two reasons. First,
Defendants argue that at the time of the alleged oral agreement, Ordan did not make a return
promise and the finder's fee was his compensation for work already performed. Second,
Defendants argue that ifOrdan did give a return promise, it was to provide the services of Ken
Southerland, and Defendants' state Ordan never compensated Southerland. However,Ordan
presents evidence of additional work for HCS beyond finding McCart as an investor for which
he admits he received a finder's fee. It is this work he claims was performed in exchange for a
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25% equity interest. Additionally, Ordan contends the compensation agreed to by Ken
Southerland was, in part, 20% of his 25% equity.
The facts asserted by both parties as to the formation of an oral contract are contested
and therefore, summary judgment as to Count 2 for Breach of Contract is hereby DENIED.

II.

Quantum Meruit
Defendants next argue that Ordan's quantum meruit claim cannot survive summary

judgment for the same reasons they argue consideration is not present; Ordan was paid a finder's
fee and he never paid for Ken Southerland's services. However, Ordan contends he provided
more to HCS than the introduction of the McCart Group and states he would be compensating
Southerland by giving him a 5% equity interest in HCS.
"A claim of unjust enrichment will lie if there is no legal contract and 'the party sought to
be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party contending an unjust enrichment which the
benefitted party equitably ought to return or compensate for. '" Jones v. White, 311 Ga. App. 822,
827 (2011) (quoting Smith v. McClung, 215 Ga. App. 786, 789(3) (1994)). The evidence of
record shows there are disputes of fact as to the formation of a contract and the services provided
by Ordan. A jury could find that no contract was formed, but that Ordan performed valuable
services for HCS for which he should be compensated for under a quantum meruit theory.
Therefore, summary judgment as to Count 3 for Quantum Meruit is hereby DENIED.
III.

Fraud, Punitive Damages, and Attorney's Fees.
Defendants next argue that Ordan's fraud claim fails because he has not established a

false representation by Keen, Keen's intention to induce Ordan's reliance, or Ordan's justifiable
reliance. "To survive a motion for summary judgment in an action for fraud... , a plaintiff must
come forward with some evidence from which a jury could find each of the following elements,
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false representation; scienter; intent to induce the party claiming fraud to act or refrain from
acting; justifiable reliance; and damage proximately caused by the representation."

JarAllah. v

Schoen et al., 243 Ga. App. 402,403-04 (2000).
Here, Ordan contends that he was promised 25% equity and he relied on this promise by
continuing to work for HCS. As previously discussed, the evidence could support a finding that
Keen promised Ordan equity. However, a disputed promise alone with no evidence of scienter
or present intent not to perform the promise is insufficient to create a fraud claim. "[T]he general
rule is that actionable fraud cannot be predicated upon promises to perform some act in the
future." J Kinson Cook of Ga. , Inc. v. HeerylMitchell,284 Ga App. 552,558 (2007) (quoting
Hamilton v. Advance Leasing, etc., 208 Ga App. 848, 850(2) (1993)) (affirming grant of
summary judgment on fraud claim). "Nor does actionable fraud result from a mere failure to
perform promises made. Otherwise any breach of a contract would amount to fraud." Id. The
exception to the general rule is "where a promise as to future events is made with a present intent
not to perform." Id. at 559 (finding that vague, equivocal, self-serving, conclusory evidence is
insufficient evidence of present intent not to perform); see also Pacrim Assoc. v. Turner Home
Entertainment, Inc., 235 Ga App 761, 767 (1998) (affirming summary judgment on fraud claim
because plaintiff did not present any evidence of defendant's intent not to comply with promise
at the time when the promise was made to make plaintiff exclusive licensing agent). Here, there
is no evidence that Keen made promises to Ordan with a present intent not to fulfill them.
Therefore, summary judgment as to Count 4 for Fraud is hereby GRANTED.
Since the fraud claim cannot stand, summary judgment as to Count 6 for Punitive
Damages is hereby GRANTED.
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Further, since recovery is still possible on multiple claims, summary judgment as to
Count 8 for Attorney's Fees and Costs is hereby DENIED.

So ORDERED this

??Mday of January, 2015.
BETH E. LONG, E lOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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John M. Gross
AmyK. Weber
TAYLOR ENGLISH DUMA LLP
1600 Parkwood Circle, Suite 400
Atlanta, Georgia 30339
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Todd J. Poole
Jon David W. Huffman
POOLE LAW GROUP
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